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Abstract
We develop a notion of subgames and the related notion of subgame-perfect
equilibrium – possibly in mixed strategies – for stochastic timing games. To
capture all situations that can arise in continuous-time models, it is necessary to
consider stopping times as the starting dates of subgames. We generalize Fuden-
berg and Tirole’s (1985) mixed-strategy extensions to make them applicable to
stochastic timing games and thereby provide a sound basis for subgame-perfect
equilibria of preemption games. Sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence
are presented, and examples illustrate their application as well as the fact that
intuitive arguments can break down in the presence of stochastic processes with
jumps.
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equilibrium, continuous time, optimal stopping
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1. Introduction
Timing plays a crucial role in economics, be it in terms of the right time to
enter a market, to stop an experiment, or to initiate a new monetary policy, to
name just a few important issues. Such timing issues are often best formulated
in continuous time because then powerful analytical tools allowing for elegant
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solutions and providing additional insight into the structure of timing decisions
become available. Continuous time may also be more appropriate for problems
in which the strict order of moves that discrete time dictates appears as an
arbitrary imposition. However, modeling dynamic information and interaction
in continuous time is conceptually much more challenging than in discrete time.
Familiar principles from discrete time should serve as analogies, but they cannot
be transferred directly.
In this paper we establish a framework to analyze timing games dynamically
in continuous time, possibly under uncertainty about some exogenous state
of the world. Therefore we address issues concerning two kinds of dynamic
information in continuous time: information about moves of strategically acting
agents and information about the exogenous state of the world.
First, from a game-theoretic perspective, it is well known that modeling
interaction in continuous time leads to fundamental problems. If one tries to
mimic discrete time by defining histories of actions at each time t ∈ R+ –
and strategies depending on these histories – determining consistent outcomes
quickly becomes impossible. The problem arises if a “move” by some player
does not identify a specific “next” point in time at which another player is
allowed to move. As continuous time is not well ordered, it would be necessary
to impose such a structure to obtain an analog of the extensive form of discrete-
time games.1 These problems even pertain to timing games in which each player
can only move once such that histories seem to be simple objects (see Simon
and Stinchcombe, 1989, for many illuminating examples). Nevertheless, the
fact that each player has only one move allows us to model some instantaneous
reactions, but to avoid mutual conditioning of simultaneous moves. Therefore
we adopt the following concept implicit in, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)
and Laraki et al. (2005).
The dynamic perspective on the game is composed of stacking normal form
views taken in different situations in a consistent way. Situations are therefore
distinguished by time, a mode which describes who has already moved, and the
information about the exogenous state in our case. Normal form strategies are
plans when to move that are conditional on the present mode. These strategies
are, thus, only executed if no one moves before. Changes to the mode are
observable instantaneously, and then the strategies of the remaining players for
the new mode apply. This concept facilitates, e.g., that player 2 moves whenever
player 1 moves, but not that player 2 moves only if player 1 does not move.2
A new normal form view is taken whenever a move could be scheduled. It is
1See, e.g., Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2008) for problems in defining dynamic strategies
that can be mapped to consistent outcomes. The authors propose an infinite generalization of
classic trees and show that it is generally necessary for nodes to have clearly defined successors.
Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) restrict continuous-time games to increasingly fine grids and
bound the number of moves in order to obtain well-defined limit outcomes.
2In order to move only as an instantaneous reaction, player 2’s strategy for the initial mode
would be to never move; for the mode “player 1 has moved,” player 2’s strategy would be to
move instantaneously.
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then possible to consider arbitrary deviations – respectively revisions of plans –
and to apply the dynamic programming principle during each mode.
Situations in which moves can (potentially) occur define the starts of sub-
games in discrete time. In continuous time we need to carefully consider the
second kind of dynamic information – that concerning the exogenous state of
the world – in order to define subgames. As before it is not sufficient to treat
times t ∈ R+ individually, in contrast to other attempts in the literature. It is
generally impossible to obtain well-specified plans of behavior for all contingen-
cies in continuous time by only singling out information sets at different values
of t – on which a move can occur or not – as is done in discrete time. Instead, as
we argue, a definition of subgames needs to be based on the notion of stopping
times in order to gain a complete and consistent model.
Normal form views of different subgames overlap substantially. We require
strategies for different subgames to be consistent, such that the overall view can
be understood analogous to the extensive form analysis in discrete time. When
applied to discrete time, our approach becomes indeed equivalent.3
On the one hand, our new concept of subgames and subgame-perfect equi-
libria provides a complete and consistent mathematical foundation for timing
games in continuous time (under uncertainty). On the other hand, our con-
cept also reflects the economic structure of the players’ decision problems more
appropriately than earlier attempts by placing a strong emphasis on dynamic
programming principles. This general framework also benefits the analysis of
models with Markovian structure, like most applications of stochastic timing
games, for which it is natural to use reduced-form value functions on the state
space.4 Thinking rigorously in terms of stopping problems helps in understand-
ing equilibrium mechanics better and in providing complete arguments for equi-
librium verification.
Indeed, we apply our framework to give sound footing to important basic
results from the growing literature on strategic real options (e.g., from some
seminal papers listed below). Therefore we also extensively discuss preemption
issues, which may cause equilibrium nonexistence, even for mixed strategies. In
addition to allowing players to randomize over plans of when to move, we define
strategy extensions that facilitate endogenous coordination in order to support
equilibria with mutual preemption.
More specifically, we generalize Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1985) approach such
that it can be applied to stochastic settings.5 The approach is less ad hoc
3A consistent set of normal form strategies in discrete time can be fully characterized by
the prescriptions for the respective first period, specifically by the probabilities with which
the planned move times are or exceed the respective first period. Furthermore, any state-
dependent (stopping) time in discrete time can be fully characterized by specifying for each
period the event on which the time occurs.
4Dutta and Rustichini (1993) have a Markovian model and only consider equilibria in
Markovian strategies. They first define a more general notion of subgames and strategies, but
again based on deterministic dates.
5Thijssen et al. (2012) – and subsequently Boyarchenko and Levendorski˘ı (2014) – take a
different route to adapting Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1985) approach. First, they use uncon-
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than are simple tie-breaking rules6 and does not replace any outcomes with
others, thereby leaving some risk of simultaneous moves, which is a key aspect
of preemption. This approach furthermore aims at consistency with limits from
discrete-time games with vanishing period lengths.7 To accommodate standard
asymmetric or stochastic models, we have to remove some of Fudenberg and
Tirole’s (1985) regularity properties and carefully revisit the determination of
outcomes. Although defining the outcome for any profile of extended strategies
takes up some space, it follows a clear intuition and leads to general standard
patterns to support preemption equilibria. Our results can be used as a basis
for the dynamic analysis of much richer models than before and can thereby
extend both the applied and the theoretic literature.8
In order to embed preemption into more general subgame-perfect equilib-
ria, we finally consider the complementary problem: verifying the optimality of
waiting. Such problems are neglected in many real-option games. An intuitive
sufficient condition for the optimality of waiting is that there is second-mover
advantage and that the first-mover’s payoff increases in expectation. We reveal
that this argument is sensitive to jumps in the underlying processes. Specifi-
cally, we prove a general positive result for continuous processes. Afterwards
we present an economic example involving random jumps for which the argu-
ment fails. The jumps are generated in the most standard way by a Poisson
component.
1.1. Related literature
Strategic timing problems appear in an abundance of contexts, particularly
in economics. There is a vast amount of literature on this classic topic, and we
thus only name a few works that are most related to ours for certain reasons.
On the one hand there is the literature on mainly deterministic timing games
in continuous time that is inspired by a wide range of applications, such as
preemption problems in economics (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985; Hendricks
and Wilson, 1992) or wars of attrition in biology or economics (e.g., Hendricks
et al., 1988). These models are often very stylized with systematic first or
ditional strategies, which do not depend on whether the respective other player has already
moved. Second, they force each player’s strategy and distribution of move time to be identical
by imposing a joint restriction on feasible profiles of strategies. Our strategies are conditional
on the move history, and we allow each player to choose any strategy from the individually
feasible set and then determine induced outcome distributions.
6A commonly used rule is coin tossing. See, e.g., Grenadier (1996) or Hoppe and Lehmann-
Grube (2005).
7Simon (1987) formalizes the view of continuous time as “discrete, but with an arbitrarily
fine grid” for deterministic timing games by restricting a given strategy profile to ever finer
grids and identifying a limit outcome. Steg (2016) shows that Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1985)
preemption equilibrium is the limit of subgame-perfect equilibria of discrete-time approxima-
tions of the game.
8See Steg and Thijssen (2015) for a real-option game with both first- and second-mover ad-
vantages arising dynamically and in which exercise occurs in both regimes in a Markov perfect
equilibrium in mixed strategies. Steg (2015b) uses the present framework to construct and
analyze subgame-perfect equilibria in mixed strategies for general symmetric timing games.
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second-mover advantages or payoff monotonicities. Laraki et al. (2005) consider
general deterministic N -player games with payoffs that are just continuous func-
tions of time (for given identities of first-movers). They prove that ε-equilibria
always exist but that exact equilibria do not necessarily exist.
On the other hand, as we emphasize uncertainty, the literature on Dynkin
games with a large tradition in mathematics also warrants mentioning here.
Classically, however, these are two-person, zero-sum timing games, and the cen-
tral question is the existence of a value under varying conditions, respectively
whether there is a saddle point in strategy space. Here, we just refer to Touzi
and Vieille’s (2002) more recent work as their payoff processes are very general
and as they use a different concept of mixed strategies (but without consider-
ing subgames). Touzi and Vieille (2002) prove that many more Dynkin games
have a value if the players are allowed to randomize over stopping times and
that such strategies are payoff-equivalent to state-dependent cumulative distri-
butions functions as used here. Quite recently, the two strands of the literature
have begun to merge by considering stochastic timing games with non-zero-sum
payoffs. Hamadène and Zhang (2010), for instance, have proven the existence of
Nash equilibrium for 2-player games with a general second-mover advantage.9
The type of application on which we focus is strategic investment under un-
certainty. Some early models that we will revisit include those by Weeds (2002)
and similar models by Pawlina and Kort (2006), Mason and Weeds (2010),
and followers. We propose strategies that support the equilibrium outcomes
described in these papers.
1.2. Organization of the paper
We begin by defining the stochastic timing game and our notion of sub-
games and mixed strategies in Section 2. In Section 3 we derive equilibria in
extended mixed strategies for preemption games with local first-mover advan-
tages. Our concepts and general results are illustrated by several applications in
Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss how our framework can be applied to models
that qualitatively extend the scope of the literature on timing games, including
games with more than two players. The Appendix presents all proofs and some
technical results.
2. A framework for stochastic timing games
We consider a timing game between two players in continuous time t ∈ R+.
There may be uncertainty about a relevant state of the world, and exogenously
evolving information about that state, which are represented by a fixed filtered
probability space
(
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P
)
.
9See also Hamadène and Hassani (2014) for an extension to N players using a similar
approach. Laraki and Solan (2013) make less assumptions concerning the incentives in a 2-
player game. Consequently, even allowing for mixed strategies, they can only prove existence
of ε-equilibria. None of these papers considers subgame perfection and their constructed
equilibria will generally not be subgame-perfect.
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Each player can move once. Moves are irreversible, so any move changes the
mode of the game that summarizes who has already moved. A change of the
mode is instantaneously observable. If both players move simultaneously in the
initial mode, the game ends. If only one player moves, the game is reduced to a
simple decision problem for the remaining player. By the change of the mode,
the remaining player gets a second chance to move in the same instant, or at
any other point of remaining time. We focus on modeling the initial mode of the
game in which nobody has moved, and encode the behavior of any remaining
player in the (continuation) payoffs at the time of the first move, resp. the first
change of mode.
As explained in the Introduction, strategies are open loop concerning other
players’ moves within each mode. They are plans when to move (or “stop”) if
no one else moves before. Strategies may, however, condition on the dynamic
information about the state. Feasible state-dependent plans are thus stopping
times τ : Ω → [0,∞], such that for every t ∈ R+ the event “stop before time
t” is identifiable by the available information about the state, i.e., {τ ≤ t} :=
{ω ∈ Ω | τ(ω) ≤ t} ∈ Ft. The value τ(ω) =∞ is interpreted as never stopping.
Denote the set of all stopping times by T , which are the pure strategies for the
initial mode of the game.
If players i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i Ó= j, plan to stop at the stopping times τi and
τj , respectively, then the initial mode of the game ends at the stopping time
min(τi, τj). Player i is called the leader if τi < τj , and the follower if τi > τj .
Otherwise, the players move simultaneously at τi = τj . Taking the (optimal,
mode-contingent) behavior of any player who becomes follower at an arbitrary
stopping time τ ∈ T as given, let Liτ and F iτ denote the implied expected
continuation payoffs for player i as leader or follower, respectively. Let M iτ
denote the expected payoff at τ if the players stop simultaneously. The indices i
allow for the role-specific payoffs to depend also on the identities of the players.
Then the expected payoff to player i at time 0 is
pii (τi, τj) := E
[
Liτi1{τi<τj} + F
i
τj1{τj<τi} +M
i
τi1{τi=τj}
]
. (2.1)
We assume that the continuation payoffs at the time of the first move are
given by six stochastic processes Li = (Lit)t≥0, F i = (F it )t≥0 andM i = (M it )t≥0
that are evaluated at the relevant stopping time. These processes are our basic
data for the game and we need to make some standard regularity assumptions
in order to have well defined (stopping) problems in the following.
Assumption 2.1.
(1) The filtration F := (Ft)t≥0 satisfies the usual conditions: it is right-
continuous and complete (i.e., every Ft contains all subsets of any P -null
set from F ).
(2) The processes Li, F i and M i, i ∈ {1, 2}, are adapted, right-continuous
(a.s.) and of class (D), each M i having an (F -measurable) extension to
t =∞ with E[|M i∞|] <∞.
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Remark 2.2.
(1) A measurable process X is of class (D) if the family {Xτ | τ ∈ T , τ <
∞} is uniformly integrable, so that the family is bounded in L1(P ) and
pointwise convergence of X at a stopping time implies convergence in
L1(P ) as well. This is a mild regularity condition implied by, e.g., either
E[supt |Xt|] < ∞ or supτ E[|Xτ |p] < ∞ for some p > 1. We may equiva-
lently define any extension X∞ ∈ L1(P ) and consider all stopping times
(possibly taking the value ∞) in the previous set; cf. Lemma B.1 in the
appendix.
(2) It depends on the setting whether there is a natural payoff if both players
“never stop”, which may be some limit of M i or of Li. In any case we
denote the payoff by M i∞ for a convenient notation. For convenience we
also define
F i∞ := M i∞.
(3) By assumption, Liτ and F iτ give the values implied by a potential follower
problem at any stopping time τ . If the follower problems are to be modeled
explicitly, one needs to take care that there exist processes (Lit)t≥0 and
(F it )t≥0 with the assumed properties; see Example 2.5 below or, for more
general conditions, Steg (2015a).
Now we can give a first definition that can be seen as the normal form of
(the initial mode of) a timing game.
Definition 2.3. A timing game Γ is a tuple((
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P
)
,T ×T , (Li, F i,M i )
i=1,2,
(
pii
)
i=1,2
)
consisting of a filtered probability space
(
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P
)
, stopping times T
as pure strategies, adapted processes
(
Li, F i,M i
)
i=1,2 satisfying Assumption
2.1, and payoffs pii given by (2.1).
The dynamic view on the game will consist in reconsidering the normal form
at any time at which a move could occur, resp. at which some player could stop,
and requiring the sets of open loop strategies for all subgames to be consistent.
Before, however, we present two examples that serve to illustrate our framework
and why we model the concepts as we do; they will be analyzed in detail in
Section 4.
Example 2.4. A stochastic grab-the-dollar-game. This stochastic variant of
the grab-the-dollar game presented in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) will help to
motivate our formulation of mixed strategies and illustrate the role of dynamic
information about the state.
We consider an American and her European friend playing the grab-the-
dollar game. When the European wins the dollar, he has to turn it into Euros,
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at a stochastic exchange rate given by an adapted, strictly positive and right-
continuous process X. If both players grab the dollar at the same time, they
pay a penalty of 1 currency unit in their local currency.
Let 0 < exp(−r) < 1 be the discount factor for both players. The payoffs are
thus L1t = exp(−rt) for the American and L2t = Xt exp(−rt) for the European
if they win the dollar at time t ∈ R+, respectively. As in the usual grab-the-
dollar game, F 1t = F 2t = 0, and for the simultaneous stopping payoffs we set
M1t = M2t = − exp(−rt) and M1∞ = M2∞ = 0.
Example 2.5. Preemptive market entry. This is a basic model of preemptive
investment under uncertainty, which will serve to illustrate how to apply our
framework to similar models in the literature, to overcome evident issues in their
analysis. The model corresponds to, e.g., that of Grenadier (1996) without con-
struction delay, that of Weeds (2002) without initial R&D and that of Pawlina
and Kort (2006) with symmetric investment cost.
Two firms i = 1, 2 have the opportunity to invest irreversibly in the same
market. The return from investment, in particular the profit flow from operating
in the market, is uncertain. Assume the duopoly profit flow when both firms
have invested is given by the observable, non-negative process X (a geometric
Brownian motion for concreteness). If only one firm is present in the market,
it can realize a monopoly markup and increase the profit flow to MX for some
constant M > 1. There is a sunk cost of investment I > 0. We assume that
profits are discounted at a common and constant rate r > 0.
If some firm invests at time τ ∈ T as the leader, the other firm that becomes
follower obtains the option to (re-)determine an optimal investment time in
reaction. The follower’s payoff is thus the value function of the optimal stopping
problem
F iτ := sup
τ ′≥τ
E
[∫ ∞
τ ′
e−rs(Xs − rI) ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ].
Immediate investment is still feasible – assuming zero reaction lags in continuous
time. Suppose the follower’s problem has a solution. Denote it by τF (τ) ∈ T
to indicate the dependence on τ . Then the leader enjoys the monopoly profit
only on [τ, τF (τ)), and the leader’s payoff is thus given by
Liτ := E
[∫ τF (τ)
τ
e−rs(MXs − rI) ds+
∫ ∞
τF (τ)
e−rs(Xs − rI) ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ].
The payoff from simultaneous investment at τ ∈ T is simply
M iτ := E
[∫ ∞
τ
e−rs(Xs − rI) ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ].
Given sufficient regularity of the process X, such as continuity and the strong
Markov property, there are indeed right-continuous, adapted processes (Lit)t≥0,
(F it )t≥0 and (M it )t≥0 that, if evaluated at any τ ∈ T , yield the previously
specified payoffs (see Section 4.2).
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2.1. Subgames
The strategy spaces T alone would make the analysis of the game essentially
static. For a truly dynamic view on the game, and for ruling out non-credible
threats, one also has to consider behavior off the intended path of play, i.e.,
subgames and corresponding strategies. Focussing on the initial mode of the
game, we consider hypothetical situations in which nobody has moved, but in
which someone could move. The feasible state-dependent dates to schedule
moves are stopping times. We thus consider stopping times also as dates at
which strategies can be revisited.
In discrete time one can characterize a stopping time τ and the information
about the state available at τ by the events {ω ∈ Ω | τ(ω) = t} ∈ Ft for the
different periods t. In continuous time, however, it is not sufficient to consider
deterministic times t ∈ R+ and their distinguishable events Ft (as it is typically
done in the literature). Stopping times in continuous time generate a much
richer dynamic information structure, the σ-fieldsFτ , that have to be addressed
directly.10
The problems arising in continuous time can be seen by means of one of the
most prominent examples for a stopping time: the first moment a Brownian
motion exceeds a certain fixed value b > 0. This “first passage time” (or hitting
time) has a continuous distribution with full support on (0,∞).11 If we wanted
to infer behavior at such a hitting time τ from plans for deterministic times t,
i.e., Ft-measurable objects, and tried to construct a state-dependent plan via
τ(ω) = t, this would mean aggregating uncountably many events of probability
zero and would not give a measurable object in general.
Therefore we reconsider the game at every stopping time and use stopping
times to characterize the starts of arbitrary subgames in which nobody has
moved. We take again the normal form view on each subgame. The dynamic
perspective on the full game will then be composed of considering all subgames
in a consistent way.
Definition 2.6. Let ϑ ∈ T be a stopping time. Let Γ be a timing game. The
subgame Γϑ starting at the stopping time ϑ is the tuple((
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P
)
,Tϑ ×Tϑ,
(
Li, F i,M i
)
i=1,2,
(
piϑi
)
i=1,2
)
consisting of the filtered probability space
(
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P
)
, stopping times
greater equal ϑ
Tϑ := {τ ∈ T | τ(ω) ≥ ϑ(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω}
10For any stopping time τ ∈ T , the σ-field Fτ is defined as {A ∈ F∞ |A ∩ {τ ≤ t} ⊂
Ft∀t ∈ R+} (where F∞ is the σ-field generated by
⋃
t∈R+ Ft). The σ-fields Fτ provide a
“more general concept of a past” than Ft for deterministic times t ∈ R+ (Revuz and Yor,
1999).
11The first passage time has the density b(2pit3)−
1
2 e−b
2/2t > 0 on (0,∞); see, e.g., Revuz
and Yor (1999), Section II.3.
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as pure strategies, adapted processes
(
Li, F i,M i
)
i=1,2 and conditional payoffs
piϑi (τi, τj) = E
[
Liτi1{τi<τj} + F
i
τj1{τj<τi} +M
i
τi1{τi=τj}
∣∣Fϑ], τi, τj ∈ Tϑ.
Our definition of subgames can also be seen as an analogy to the general
approach to stopping problems for a single decision maker. The solution of
an optimal stopping problem can be represented as a consistent collection of
contingent plans for starting from any stopping time, representing the dynamic
programming principle in continuous time.12 Similarly, our approach allows us
to speak meaningfully of contingent plans for subgames and to define subgame-
perfect equilibria.
2.1.1. Mixed strategies in subgames
Many timing games have no equilibria in pure strategies. We thus introduce
mixed strategies, following the approach by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), but
generalizing it to our stochastic setting. These strategies are first formulated
for every subgame, indexed by the start ϑ ∈ T . Then we will impose natural
consistency conditions on strategies for different subgames, implying that our
approach becomes equivalent with behavior strategies when applied to discrete
time.
The starting point for a mixed strategy is a distribution function Gϑi over
remaining time.13 Gϑi may depend on the state of the world in the sense that
the cumulative probability of having stopped up to any future time t must be
inferable from the state information provided by the filtration, Ft.
Distributions over time are still not sufficient to obtain any equilibria in some
very basic, well-behaved games with preemption incentives, which are central
for applications.14 Therefore we also generalize the strategy extensions αϑi of
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) as a coordination device for stochastic models.
These extensions will specify time-dependent conditional stopping probabilities
in continuous time, i.e., not cumulative probabilities. They should thus not
charge the past [0, ϑ), either, but need not be monotone.
Definition 2.7. Fix a stopping time ϑ ∈ T . An extended mixed strategy for
player i ∈ {1, 2} for the subgame Γϑ starting at ϑ, also called ϑ-strategy, is a
pair of processes
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
taking values in [0, 1], respectively, with the following
properties.
(1) Gϑi is adapted. It is a.s. right-continuous, non-decreasing, and satisfying
Gϑi (s) = 0 for all s < ϑ.
12See, e.g., El Karoui (1981) for the general theory of optimal stopping and the concept of
the Snell envelope.
13An alternative approach is to randomize over stopping times before the game starts. Touzi
and Vieille (2002) show that the two approaches are payoff-equivalent. They do not consider,
however, any notion of subgame (perfection) or further extensions as we do.
14See, e.g., Hendricks and Wilson (1992) for a deterministic, arbitrarily smooth preemption
game without equilibrium in mixed strategies in the form of distributions over time.
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(2) αϑi is progressively measurable.15 It is a.s. right-continuous in all t ∈ R+
for which αϑi (t) ∈ (0, 1) and satisfying αϑi (s) = 0 for all s < ϑ.
(3)
αϑi (t) > 0⇒ Gϑi (t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0 a.s.
We further define Gϑi (0−) ≡ 0, Gϑi (∞) ≡ 1 and αϑi (∞) ≡ 1 for every extended
mixed strategy.
Remark 2.8.
(1) As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), the extensions αϑi are a coordination
instrument when the distribution functions Gϑi jump to 1, aiming to cap-
ture richer limit outcomes from discrete-time approximations of the game.
When some αϑi is positive, some move will happen instantaneously, and
the relative values of αϑ1 and αϑ2 will determine the probabilities of each
player becoming leader or stopping simultaneously with the other. Right-
continuity of the processes αϑi is important to determine limit outcomes.
We do not require it when αϑi (t) is zero or one, in order to deal with some
important classes of games (see Remark 3.2 and Section 4 below).
(2) Progressive measurability ensures enough structure in the time domain
such that αϑi (τ) will be Fτ -measurable for any τ ∈ T , e.g., for the crucial
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 |αϑi (t) > 0}. Gϑi (0−) ≡ 0 and the terminal values for t =∞
are defined for notational convenience in the definition of payoffs.
Our analysis of Examples 2.4 and 2.5 in Section 4 below will illustrate how
strategies need to react to the dynamic information about the state of the world.
2.1.2. Outcomes and payoffs
We have to generalize the payoffs (2.1) from the start of the game to sub-
games and (extended) mixed strategies. Therefore we first determine outcome
probabilities – of who stops first and when – that result from a pair of extended
mixed strategies
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
and
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
for a given subgame starting at ϑ ∈ T .
The outcome distribution will then be mapped to expected payoffs via the payoff
processes.
The mixed strategy profile (Gϑ1 , Gϑ2 ) alone will be rather standard to handle,
so we concentrate on discussing the extensions (αϑ1 , αϑ2 ). The intuition taken
from Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) is to enable the players to put a positive
stopping probability (conditional on nobody having stopped before) on every
15For every t ∈ R+, the function (ω, s) Ô→ αϑi (ω, s) must be Ft⊗B([0, t])-measurable on the
restricted domain Ω × [0, t] (where B([0, t]) denotes the Borel sets of [0, t]). This is stronger
than (i.e., it implies) adaptedness, but weaker than (i.e., implied by) optionality, which holds
for Gϑi by right-continuity. However, we can also assume αϑi to be optional without loss by
using its unique optional projection oαϑi . Indeed, at any τ ∈ T the two agree a.s. by definition
and oαϑi is right-continuous where αϑi is so by Lemma B.3, such that the outcome probabilities
in Definition 2.9 below remain the same.
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time t ≥ ϑ, denoted by αϑi (t), mimicking a discrete-time game on an “infinitely
fine” grid, or representing the limit of a sequence of strategies for discrete-time
games with vanishing period length.
The idea can be illustrated by means of the grab-the-dollar game; we use our
stochastic variant, Example 2.4. On any discrete grid of time, this game has
several subgame-perfect equilibria with some player grabbing the dollar with
probability one in every given period and the opponent abstaining, so there is
perfect coordination to avoid costly collisions. The one who grabs can be, e.g.,
always player 1, because she has no incentive to wait, or both players can grab
alternately.16 In addition, there is a fully mixed subgame-perfect equilibrium:
If player 1 grabs with probability L2tn/(L
2
tn −M2tn) = Xtn/(Xtn + 1) in every
period tn (recall that the exchange rate X is strictly positive) and player 2
with probability L1tn/(L
1
tn −M1tn) = 1/2, then every (pure or mixed) strategy
gives each player the payoff 0. As the period length vanishes, the limit of each
strategy is to grab immediately. Nevertheless, the probability of a collision does
not converge to one, but X0/(2X0 + 1).
More generally, limit outcomes are easy to identify if the families (αϑ1 (t), αϑ2 (t))t≥ϑ
are sufficiently regular with respect to time. Where αϑi (·) is positive and right-
continuous, there are in the limit arbitrarily many consecutive stopping proba-
bilities that vary arbitrarily little in arbitrarily short time intervals. Thus, in the
limit, stopping occurs immediately with probability one (reflected in Gϑi (·) = 1),
and the limit distribution over the identity of who stops first – player 1, player
2, or both – is that of an infinitely repeated game with constant stage stop-
ping probabilities. The distribution is given by the functions µL and µM from
[0, 1]2 \ {(0, 0)} to [0, 1] defined by
µL(x, y) := x(1− y)
∞∑
n=0
[(1− x)(1− y)]n = x(1− y)
x+ y − xy
and µM (x, y) :=
xy
x+ y − xy .
µL(ai, aj) is the probability that player i stops first if players i and j stop
with probabilities ai and aj , respectively, in every stage of a repeated game.
µM (ai, aj) is the probability of simultaneous stopping and 1 − µL(ai, aj) −
µM (ai, aj) = µL(aj , ai) is that of player j stopping first.
The limit outcome can incorporate special “first round” behavior. If only one
player uses the extension αϑi (t) > 0, whereas the other uses a distribution Gϑj
with an isolated atom, i.e., ∆Gϑj (t) := Gϑj (t)−Gϑj (t−) > 0 and αϑj (·) = 0 on an
interval from t, the outcome is that of stopping with (conditional) probabilities(
αϑi (t),∆Gϑj (t)/[1−Gϑj (t−)]
)
in the first round and with
(
αϑi (t), 0
)
thereafter.
As a result, player i becomes leader at t unless j stops in the first round. This
case extends to αϑi having positive values arbitrarily close to t from the right but
16It may or not be an equilibrium that player 2 always grabs and player 1 never, because
the payoff Xt exp(−rt) may be increasing in expectation.
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αϑi (t) = 0, because if αϑj (·) = 0 to the right of t, player i becomes leader once t
is passed due to the arbitrarily many positive consecutive stopping probabilities
before the next possible atom of Gϑj . Thus, we do not need right-continuity to
identify the limit outcomes in these cases, and neither so if αϑi (t) = 1, when
player i stops definitely in the first round.
Difficulties arise if both αϑi start to be positive at the same time and at least
one still equals zero at that point. One problem is that µL has no continuous
extension at the origin (whereas that of µM is µM (0, 0) := 0), and another is the
possible lack of right-continuity of the extensions. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)
require differentiability with a positive derivative in such a case, which is not
feasible for the (asymmetric and/or stochastic) models we are going to deal with.
Instead, we take a right-hand limit of the outcome distribution, again combined
with a “first round” if some αϑi is not right-continuous (and thus equals zero at
the critical point).
The following outcome probabilities generated by the extensions, of who
stops first at
τˆϑ := inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑ1 (t) + αϑ2 (t) > 0},
are defined as seen from ϑ, so their leading term is the probability of reaching τˆϑ
with no player having stopped before,
(
1−Gϑ1 (τˆϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑ2 (τˆϑ−)
)
. Note that
Definition 2.7 (iii) implies
(
1−Gϑi (τˆϑ−)
)
= ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ) if τˆϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑi (t) >
0}. If (1 − Gϑi (τˆϑ−)) = 0, we define (1 − Gϑi (τˆϑ−))/(1 − Gϑi (τˆϑ−)) := 0 for
notational convenience.
Definition 2.9. Given ϑ ∈ T and a pair of extended mixed strategies (Gϑ1 , αϑ1 ),(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
, the outcome probabilities λϑL,1, λϑL,2 and λϑM for player 1 becoming
leader, player 2 becoming leader and simultaneous stopping, respectively, at τˆϑ
are defined as follows. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i Ó= j.
If τˆϑ < τˆϑj := inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑj (t) > 0}, then
λϑL,i := ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)
(
1−Gϑj (τˆϑ−)
)[
1− ∆G
ϑ
j (τˆϑ)
1−Gϑj (τˆϑ−)
]
= ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)
(
1−Gϑj (τˆϑ)
)
,
λϑM := ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)
(
1−Gϑj (τˆϑ−)
)
αϑi (τˆϑ)
∆Gϑj (τˆϑ)
1−Gϑj (τˆϑ−)
= ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)∆Gϑj (τˆϑ)αϑi (τˆϑ).
If τˆϑ < τˆϑi := inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑi (t) > 0}, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆϑ−)
)
∆Gϑj (τˆϑ)
∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)
1−Gϑi (τˆϑ−)
(
1− αj(τˆϑ)
)
= ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)∆Gϑj (τˆϑ)
(
1− αj(τˆϑ)
)
,
λϑM :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆϑ−)
)
∆Gϑj (τˆϑ)
∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)
1−Gϑi (τˆϑ−)
αj(τˆϑ) = ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)∆Gϑj (τˆϑ)αϑj (τˆϑ).
If τˆϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆϑ2 and either max
{
αϑ1 (τˆϑ), αϑ2 (τˆϑ)
}
= 1 or min
{
αϑ1 (τˆϑ), αϑ2 (τˆϑ)
}
>
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0, then
λϑL,i := ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)∆Gϑj (τˆϑ)µL(αϑi (τˆϑ), αϑj (τˆϑ)),
λϑM := ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)∆Gϑj (τˆϑ)µM (αϑ1 (τˆϑ), αϑ2 (τˆϑ)).
If τˆϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆϑ2 , max
{
αϑ1 (τˆϑ), αϑ2 (τˆϑ)
}
< 1 and min
{
αϑ1 (τˆϑ), αϑ2 (τˆϑ)
}
= 0,
then
λϑL,i := ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)∆Gϑj (τˆϑ)
(
1− αϑj (τˆϑ)
)
·
(
αϑi (τˆϑ) +
(
1− αϑi (τˆϑ)
) 1
2
{
lim inf
t↘τˆϑ
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)>0
µL(αϑi (t), αϑj (t))
+ lim sup
t↘τˆϑ
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)>0
µL(αϑi (t), αϑj (t))
})
,
λϑM := ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)∆Gϑj (τˆϑ)− λϑL,i − λϑL,j
= ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ)∆Gϑj (τˆϑ)
(
1− αϑi (τˆϑ)
)(
1− αϑj (τˆϑ)
)
· µM (αϑ1 (τˆϑ+), αϑ2 (τˆϑ+)) if αϑ1 (τˆϑ+) and αϑ2 (τˆϑ+) exist.
Remark 2.10.
(1) λϑL,i is also the probability of player j becoming follower at τˆϑ. In all cases
it holds that λϑM + λϑL,i + λϑL,j =
(
1−Gϑi (τˆϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆϑ−)
)
, the prob-
ability of reaching τˆϑ with no player having stopped before. Dividing the
outcome probabilities by their sum where feasible yields the correspond-
ing conditional probabilities at τˆϑ, which will be required to satisfy time
consistency.
(2) In the last case we might not have a (right-hand) limit of µL if αϑ1 (τˆϑ) =
αϑ2 (τˆϑ) = 0 even when both αϑ· are continuous, whereas a limit probability
for simultaneous stopping exists as soon as αϑ1 (τˆϑ+) and αϑ2 (τˆϑ+) do
because µM is continuous at (0, 0).17
Here we differ from Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), who ask for right-
differentiability and a positive derivative to apply a Taylor expansion,
which is a too strong requirement for asymmetric or stochastic models;
cf. Section 3. Taking instead the symmetric combination of lim inf and
lim sup ensures consistency whenever the limit exists, independence of the
players’ names, and that λϑM coincides with its associated limit whenever
17If max{αϑ1 (τˆϑ), αϑ2 (τˆϑ)} < 1 and αϑ1 (τˆϑ+), αϑ2 (τˆϑ+) exist, then the limit of µL can fail
only if αϑ1 (τˆϑ+) = αϑ2 (τˆϑ+) = 0, i.e., if αϑ1 (τˆϑ) = αϑ2 (τˆϑ) = 0; if αϑi (τˆϑ+) > 0, the limit of
µL is determined by continuity. If the limit in a potential equilibrium does not exist, both
players will be indifferent about the roles; see Lemma C.2.
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the latter exists. Furthermore, our solution provides no incentives for the
players to create ambiguity about the limit of µL by their choice of strate-
gies (i.e., to exploit the rule of the last case): in Section 3 we show that if
any player uses the extension, then the other has a pure best reply.
(3) We stress that as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) the coordination device
ensures consistency with well-behaved limits from discrete-time approxi-
mations of the game while yielding sufficient coordination to model pre-
emption as an equilibrium; see Section 3. Regarding any formal passage to
the limit from discrete-time approximations, there is a trade-off between
the richness of sequences (of strategies or equilibria) to be captured and
the determination of well-defined limit outcomes. It is easy to construct
timing games with equilibria in which the players take arbitrary turns
of stopping in every period, which have no meaningful limit (neither in
outcomes, nor in payoffs).
(4) Finally, as a technical remark, there are no conditional expectations in the
definition, which one might expect as we are taking limits of “future” out-
come probabilities that are state-dependent. However, we have pointwise
right-hand limits and boundedness where αϑi ∈ (0, 1) and thus convergence
of expectations when we apply the limit argument. Even if the lim inf(·)
and lim sup(·) in the last case differ, they are progressively measurable by
Theorem IV.33 (c) in Dellacherie and Meyer (1978) when seen as processes
and hence Fτ -measurable at any τ ∈ T .
Now we can combine the outcome distribution from the extensions with
those from the “standard” mixed strategies and integrate the payoff processes.
Definition 2.11. Given two extended mixed strategies
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
,
(
Gϑj , α
ϑ
j
)
,
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i Ó= j, the payoff of player i in the subgame starting at ϑ ∈ T is
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
:= E
[ ∫
[0,τˆϑ)
(
1−Gϑj (s)
)
Lis dG
ϑ
i (s)
+
∫
[0,τˆϑ)
(
1−Gϑi (s)
)
F is dG
ϑ
j (s)
+
∑
s∈[0,τˆϑ)
∆Gϑi (s)∆Gϑj (s)M is
+λϑL,iLiτˆϑ + λϑL,jF iτˆϑ + λϑMM iτˆϑ
∣∣∣∣Fϑ].
Lemma B.2 in the appendix shows that the pathwise integrals (which include
possible jumps of the right-continuous integrators at 0, since i can indeed become
leader/follower from an initial jump of Gϑi /Gϑj , resp.) are well defined under
Assumption 2.1 and that the payoffs are bounded in L1(P ) – uniformly across
all feasible strategies.
Remark 2.12.
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(1) If the players do not use the extensions (i.e., αϑ1 = αϑ2 ≡ 0 on R+),
then τˆϑ = ∞, λϑL,1 = λϑL,2 = 0, and λϑM = ∆Gϑ1 (∞)∆Gϑ2 (∞), and
thus the payoffs are the same as in the analogous model with only mixed
strategies Gϑ1 , Gϑ2 . In either case any mass points at t = ∞ contribute
(1−Gϑi (∞−))(1−Gϑj (∞−))M i∞ due to Gϑi (∞) = αϑi (∞) = 1.
(2) It is also possible to interpret (α1, α2) as an endogenous sharing rule in the
spirit of Simon and Zame (1990) as follows. Instead of (M1,M2), one re-
gards the (pointwise) convex hull of {(L1, F 2), (F 1, L2), (M1,M2)} as rel-
evant payoffs for simultaneous stopping. The actual payoffs are a selection
from this set that depends on (α1, α2), and the latter are (an endogenous)
part of the solution. At each τˆϑi the selection corresponds to the probabili-
ties (λϑL,1, λϑL,2, λϑM ) if one sets Gϑ1 = Gϑ2 = (1{t≥τˆϑi }) in Definition 2.9 and
on {τˆϑi > τˆϑj } also αϑj ≡ 0. Everywhere else, it remains (M1· ,M2· ). Given
this selection, one considers non-extended mixed strategies (Gϑ1 , Gϑ2 ) that
yield the modified payoffs with probability ∆Gϑ1 (τˆϑi ) ·∆Gϑ2 (τˆϑi ). Then any
pair
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
,
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
of extended mixed strategies yields the same pay-
offs, whether evaluated as such or as mixed strategies with sharing rule.
Furthermore, keeping the sharing rule (α1, α2) fixed, unilateral deviations
to pure strategies of the form Gϑi = (1{t≥τ}) (that then typically do not
satisfy αϑi (t) > 0 ⇒ Gϑi (t) = 1 anymore) yield payoffs equal to those
from some extended mixed strategies satisfying Gϑi = (1{t≥τ}). Thus,
by linearity there cannot be profitable deviations from any equilibrium in
extended mixed strategies for the sharing rule (α1, α2), and these are also
equilibria with endogenous sharing rule.
2.1.3. Time consistency and subgame-perfect equilibrium
Now the ϑ-strategies for all subgames can be combined to a strategy for
the whole game to generate the dynamic perspective. Therefore, strategies for
different subgames are required to be time consistent in the sense that Bayes’
law holds, resp. that conditional stopping probabilities agree across strategies
when possible (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985).
Definition 2.13. A time-consistent extended mixed strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2}
for the timing game Γ is a family of ϑ-strategies
(
Gi, αi
)
=
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
ϑ∈T such
that for all ϑ, ϑ′, τ ∈ T with ϑ ≤ ϑ′ ≤ τ a.s. it holds that
Gϑi (t) = Gϑi (ϑ′−) +
(
1−Gϑi (ϑ′−)
)
Gϑ
′
i (t) for all t ≥ ϑ′ a.s.
and
αϑi (τ) = αϑ
′
i (τ) a.s.
We denote the set of such strategies for each player by S .
Note that there is in general a high level of redundancy in a family
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
ϑ∈T
because many stopping times coincide with a positive probability, so subgames
may differ only on small events. Time-consistent strategies give unique and
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well-defined prescriptions in those cases, because they imply that Gϑi = Gϑ
′
i
and αϑi = αϑ
′
i a.s. on the event {ϑ = ϑ′} for all stopping times ϑ, ϑ′ ∈ T .18
The equilibrium concept is then natural.
Definition 2.14. A subgame-perfect equilibrium for the timing game is a pair(
G1, α1
)
,
(
G2, α2
)
of time-consistent extended mixed strategies such that for all
ϑ ∈ T , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i Ó= j, and extended mixed strategies (Gϑa , αϑa)
V ϑi (Gϑi , αϑi , Gϑj , αϑj ) ≥ V ϑi (Gϑa , αϑa , Gϑj , αϑj ) a.s.,
i.e., such that every pair
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
,
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
is an equilibrium in the subgame
starting at ϑ ∈ T , respectively.
3. Preemption games
In this section we establish a quite general explicit form for subgame-perfect
equilibria in games with preemption incentives. Our Proposition 3.1 shows how
to model mutual preemption in continuous time with our strategy extensions.
It resolves conceptual problems from which some of the proposed “equilibria”
in the literature suffer and it can be applied to quite general models. Theorem
3.3 shows how to obtain subgame-perfect equilibria based on preemption in a
general setting, whereas more specific applications will be presented in Section
4.
We begin by analyzing the payoffs that can result from extended mixed
strategies, to show that equilibrium conditions have strong implications for the
relevant choices of αϑi . Throughout this section we assume F i ≥ M i (a.s., for
any t ∈ R+).19
Whenever some αϑj is positive, the (initial mode of the) game definitely ends,
and by αϑi , player i can control the probabilities of becoming leader, becom-
ing follower, or stopping simultaneously with player j, to an extent depending
on αϑj . More specifically, suppose ϑ = τˆϑj = inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑj (t) > 0}. Then
Gϑj (ϑ) = 1 and player i’s payoff from any strategy
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
will be at most
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
) ≤ max{F iϑ, αϑj (ϑ)M iϑ + (1 − αϑj (ϑ))Liϑ}.20 These payoffs
result from stopping never or immediately, respectively, i.e., from Gϑi putting
18Definition 2.13 implies the claimed property via Gϑi = Gϑ∧ϑ
′
i on {ϑ = ϑ ∧ ϑ′} and
Gϑ
′
i = Gϑ∧ϑ
′
i on {ϑ′ = ϑ ∧ ϑ′}; similarly for α·i.19The assumption F i ≥ M i is very natural if the follower still has a stopping decision to
make, such that F i is the corresponding value function and simultaneous stopping is one
option for the “follower”. On a more abstract level the condition means that we are focussing
on competitive models without a strict benefit from joint moves.
20This is easy to check, except for when the outcome probabilities λϑL,i and λ
ϑ
M involve
non-trivial limits due to ϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆϑ2 , min{αϑ1 (ϑ), αϑ2 (ϑ)} = 0 and max{αϑ1 (ϑ), αϑ2 (ϑ)} < 1;
the verification for this case is given by Lemma C.1 in the appendix. The payoff is in fact a
convex combination of F iϑ and α
ϑ
j (ϑ)M iϑ + (1 − αϑj (ϑ))Liϑ, possibly except for the case that
αϑj (ϑ) = 0 and λϑM > 0.
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full mass on {∞} or {ϑ} (and αϑi (t) = 0 for all t ∈ R+). There is, thus, a best
reply for player i that is pure.21 Stopping (waiting) is strictly optimal iff
Liϑ − F iϑ > (<)αϑj (ϑ)
(
Liϑ −M iϑ
)
. (3.1)
AsM iϑ ≤ F iϑ, waiting is optimal whenever Liϑ ≤ F iϑ, and i can only be indifferent
in that case if αϑj (ϑ)
(
F iϑ −M iϑ
)
= 0, with αϑj (ϑ) = 1 if Liϑ < F iϑ.
If Liϑ > F iϑ, i is indifferent iff
αϑj (ϑ) =
Liϑ − F iϑ
Liϑ −M iϑ
, (3.2)
which is in (0, 1] a.s.
Based on (3.2) we can find equilibria where both players try to stop whenever
both have a first-mover advantage, and where any hesitation by one player makes
the other become leader; they can be interpreted as preemption in the region
{(L1−F 1)∧ (L2−F 2) > 0}. In order to prepare for subgame-perfect equilibria
in asymmetric games where the preemption region is not reached immediately
(e.g., Theorem 3.3 below), we make sure that if one player is indifferent about
becoming leader or follower, whereas the other has a strict preference, then the
latter can realize the advantage.22
Proposition 3.1. Assume F it ≥ M it for all t ∈ R+, a.s. (i = 1, 2). For any
τ ∈ T let
τP(τ) := inf{u ≥ τ | (L1u − F 1u) ∧ (L2u − F 2u) > 0}
(for every ω ∈ Ω). If ϑ ∈ T satisfies ϑ = τP(ϑ) a.s., then (Gϑ1 , αϑ1 ), (Gϑ2 , αϑ2 )
given by
αϑi (t) =

1 if t = inf{u ≥ t | (L1u − F 1u) ∧ (L2u − F 2u) > 0},
Ljt = F
j
t and
(
Lit > F
i
t or F
j
t = M
j
t
)
,
1{L1t>F 1t }1{L2t>F 2t }
Ljt − F jt
Ljt −M jt
else
and Gϑi (t) = 1{t≥ϑ} for any t ∈ [ϑ,∞), i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i Ó= j, are an equilibrium
in the subgame starting at ϑ.
The resulting payoffs are V ϑi (Gϑi , αϑi , Gϑj , αϑj ) = F iϑ1{Lj
ϑ
>F j
ϑ
} + Liϑ1{Lj
ϑ
=F j
ϑ
}.
21An extended mixed strategy can only be superior to a pure one at an opponent’s jump
∆Gϑj (τ) that is not terminal, in order to secure the payoff ∆Gϑj (τ)F iτ + (1−Gϑj (τ))Liτ if this
is the unique optimal limit of pure (and therefore of any standard mixed) strategies. That
limit is not attainable without extensions if F iτ > M iτ .
22The proposition can easily be modified to construct equilibria with nobody realizing a
first-mover advantage and both players i = 1, 2 receiving the payoff F iϑ. The corresponding
extensions are αϑi (t) = 1{Lj
t
=Mj
t
} + 1{Lj
t
>M
j
t
}(L
j
t − F jt )/(Ljt −Mjt ) if t = inf{u ≥ t | (L1u −
F 1u) ∧ (L2u − F 2u) > 0} and αϑi (t) = 0 else.
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Remark 3.2. Note that in particular αϑi (t) = 0 if t < inf{u ≥ t | (L1u − F 1u) ∧
(L2u−F 2u) > 0}. On the “boundary” of the preemption region, i.e., if t = inf{u ≥
t | (L1u−F 1u)∧(L2u−F 2u) > 0} but (L1t −F 1t )∧(L2t −F 2t ) = 0, either αϑi might not
be right-continuous for three reasons. First, if we have Ljt = F
j
t = M
j
t , there
might not be a right-hand limit αϑi (t+), which we can accomodate by setting
αϑi (t) = 1 as player j will be indifferent. Second, in asymmetric models we have
to ensure that a player with a strict first-mover advantage Lit − F it > 0 can
realize it by playing αϑi (t) = 1 and the other playing αϑj (t) = 0; cf. Theorem
3.3 below. Third, if Ljt > F
j
t but Lit = F it , then 1{Lit>F it } might not have a
right-hand limit; in this case we have αϑi (t) = 0 (and αϑj (t) = 1).
In the symmetric case, when the payoff processes do not depend on the
players’ names, each player becomes leader or follower with probability 12 if
Lϑ = Fϑ > Mϑ, because then the lim inf and lim sup in Definition 2.9 are both
1
2 . This is the same outcome as the result of the Taylor expansion in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1985) for their smooth, deterministic model. If Lϑ > Fϑ, there is
a positive probability of simultaneous stopping, however, which is the price of
mutual preemption.
αϑi in Proposition 3.1 does not depend on ϑ (except for the requirement
αϑi =0 on [0, ϑ), of course), so applying the construction to any ϑ ∈ T induces
a subgame-perfect equilibrium if Li > F i almost everywhere for both i = 1, 2.
Otherwise, if there is not a persistent first-mover advantage, then there can exist
many different types of equilibria. One quite general class for which we can use
Proposition 3.1 is when the leader’s payoff tends to increase in expectation, i.e.,
when Li is a submartingale for each player i = 1, 2. Then no player wants to
stop where F i > Li, so stopping results only from preemption; see Theorem
3.3.23
3.1. General issues with preemption equilibria
Preemptive equilibria are central in the strategic real options literature; a
simple deterministic example is shown in Figure 1. A number of papers using
in fact stochastic models argue that in equilibrium player 1 becomes leader at
τP , and player 2 becomes follower.24
Stopping must occur no later than at τP in equilibrium, because the players
would try to preempt each other where both have a strict first-mover advantage,
i.e., Li > F i. In this deterministic example it also seems clear that no player
wants to stop at any t < τP because the payoffs keep increasing. There are two
general issues in supporting “stopping at τP” as an equilibrium.
First, for stopping to occur at τP , player 1 must not be able to realize a
further increase in L1. Exploiting the increasing payoff can only be prevented by
a (credible) threat of player 2 to stop sufficiently quickly after τP if player 1 does
23For the limits of this logic, however, see Section 4.3.
24See, e.g., Weeds (2002), Pawlina and Kort (2006), Mason and Weeds (2010).
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Figure 1: Preemption with asymmetric leader payoffs
not stop. There is no such threat in the mentioned papers.25 We model a proper
game theoretic equilibrium of preemption on (τP , T ) with the strategies given
in Proposition 3.1, such that the (first mode of the) game ends immediately at
any point in this region, even if some player deviates unilaterally. Both players
are also willing to stop immediately because the extensions αϑi allow to control
the probability of simultaneous stopping, which the players want to avoid.26
The equilibrium outcome probabilities of who stops first (player 1, player 2, or
both) depend on the relation between Li, F i and M i, i = 1, 2.
Second, on [0, τP) the players must be willing to wait until τP . In the de-
terministic example, no one wants to stop at any t < τP because the payoffs
obviously keep increasing. Nevertheless, for waiting until τP to be an equilib-
rium, (i) player 1 must also be sure to become leader and (ii) player 2 must be
sure that there is no possibility of simultaneous stopping. We support exactly
that outcome in Proposition 3.1.27 In stochastic models, however, it is much less
clear that the corresponding payoffs at τP are in expectation (at least) as good
25In particular, in many real option models, the follower still has an investment option and
F is the value of investing at some later time τF , which is optimal given that the leader
already has invested. Thus, any strategy that leads to becoming follower induces the same
outcome of investing at τF (as an implicit reaction when the leader invests). If, however, a
player ending up as follower already planned to invest at τF from the start, this would not put
preemptive pressure on the opponent, so this cannot be an equilibrium strategy (for subgames
in which nobody has invested, yet).
26A simpler alternative approach is to replace the simultaneous stopping payoffs if both
players try to stop at the same time by some distribution over payoffs that yields at least
the follower payoffs in expectation. Grenadier (1996) and Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2005),
e.g., let each player become leader or follower with probability 1/2 in their symmetric models.
27For this outcome we cannot require right-continuity of the αti(·) at τP because
then player 2 would become leader and player 1 follower for sure. Indeed, if t ≤
τP , then αt1(τP+) = limu↘τP 1{L1u>F1u}1{L2u>F2u}
L2u−Fu
L2u−Mu
= 0 and αt2(τP+) =
limu↘τP 1{L1u>F1u}1{L2u>F2u}
L1u−Fu
L1u−Mu
> 0.
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as becoming leader earlier on. Even if one observes that for typical Markovian
models the current leader and follower payoffs as functions of the state (instead
of time) look similar to Figure 1, discounting and the random time span to
reaching τP make intertemporal comparisons much more complex. Therefore
one needs to study related optimal stopping problems that are often neglected
in the literature.28 We consider these problems in the following.
3.2. Subgame-perfect preemption equilibria
A reasonable stochastic analog to a deterministically increasing leader payoff
is assuming Li to increase in expectation, i.e., to be a submartingale at least
outside the preemption region. Then we get a very general existence result,
without any particular assumption on the underlying stochastics. The intuitive
result does however rely on continuity; cf. the example in Section 4.3. An
alternative argument to obtain such “purely preemptive” equilibria is presented
in Section 4.2, based on F i being the value process of the follower’s remaining
stopping problem.
Theorem 3.3. Assume that each Li is a submartingale, that Li and F i are
a.s. continuous and that F i ≥ M i, i = 1, 2. Then there exists a subgame-
perfect equilibrium
(
G1, α1
)
,
(
G2, α2
)
with αϑi given by Proposition 3.1 and
Gϑi = 1{t≥τP(ϑ)} for all ϑ ∈ T and i = 1, 2.
The resulting payoffs are
V ϑi (Gϑi , αϑi , Gϑj , αϑj ) =
E
[
LiτP(ϑ)
∣∣Fϑ] if {ϑ < τP(ϑ)} or Ljϑ = F jϑ,
F iϑ else.
Remark 3.4. For equilibria of this type it would suffice that each Li is a
semimartingale, i.e., of the form Li = N i+Ai with a martingale N i and a finite-
variation process Ai (e.g., Li is a diffusion) and that each Ai, which inherits
continuity from Li, is non-decreasing outside the preemption region {(L1−F 1)∧
(L2 − F 2) > 0}.
4. Illustrative examples
In the following we present some examples to illustrate the equilibrium con-
cept developed in this paper. Section 4.1 shows the workings of extended mixed
strategies in a simple asymmetric game. Section 4.2 presents a standard model
from the theory of strategic investment under uncertainty and derives strate-
gies to actually support typical outcomes that are proposed in the literature
as (subgame-perfect) equilibria. Finally, Section 4.3 gives an example showing
that the logic used in Theorem 3.3 is sensitive to jumps. The focus is here on
28A frequent argument to justify waiting is a current second-mover advantage, i.e., F i > Li,
which by itself is not sufficient.
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stopping occuring by preemption. For an equilibrium with nondegenerate dis-
tributions Gϑi that imply stopping at a rate and that have both times with first-
and second-mover advantages in their support see Steg and Thijssen (2015).
4.1. Example: the cross-country grab-the-dollar-game
First, we analyze the stochastic version of the grab-the-dollar game pre-
sented as Example 2.4 to illustrate our definition of equilibrium. It shows why
it is important to allow for adapted (instead of Fϑ-measurable) strategies in
the subgames starting at some stopping time ϑ. With stochastic payoffs, it is
generally impossible to fix one’s own strategy independently of the development
of the state variables.
Recall L1t = exp(−rt) if the American wins the dollar at time t ≥ 0 and
L2t = Xt exp(−rt) if the European wins (where Xt > 0 is the exchange rate),
whereas F 1t = F 2t = 0, and the discounted penalty for simultaneous grabbing
is M1t = M2t = − exp(−rt). The following equilibrium is an application of
Proposition 3.1 for global first-mover advantages Li − F i > 0. Feasibility and
time-consistency of the strategies are straightforward to verify.
Proposition 4.1. A subgame-perfect equilibrium for the cross-country grab-the-
dollar game is given by the strategies Gϑi (t) = 1{t≥ϑ}, i = 1, 2 (“grab immedi-
ately”) and
αϑ1 (t) =
Xt
1 +Xt
1{t≥ϑ}
and
αϑ2 (t) =
1
2 1{t≥ϑ}
for all stopping times ϑ ∈ T and t ∈ R+.
This equilibrium is in fact the limit of the discrete-time mixed equilibria
discussed in Section 2.1.2, with both players’ payoffs being 0, also for any devia-
tion. αϑ1 (t) is increasing in Xt, because in order to keep player 2 indifferent, the
probability that he becomes leader must decrease and/or that of a collision must
increase, which now both hold. The outcome distribution is that either player
1 wins the dollar at t = 0 or a collision happens with probability X0/(2X0 + 1)
each, and player 2 wins with probability 1/(2X0 + 1).
4.2. Example: preemptive market entry
Now we analyze the market entry game presented as Example 2.5 – which is
a typical strategic real option exercise problem – in order to show how to derive
(even subgame-perfect) equilibrium strategies for similar models.
In order to obtain possibly explicit results and because this is the most
familiar model in the literature, we let the duopoly profit stream after entry by
both firms X = (Xt)t≥0 be a geometric Brownian motion. The idea of proof
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is very general, however; see Steg (2015a). Hence, assume now that X is the
unique strong solution to the stochastic differential equation
dX
X
= µdt+ σ dB
with given initial value X0 = x ∈ R+, where B is a Brownian motion and µ,
σ are some constants. Furthermore, profits are discounted at a common and
constant rate r > max(µ, 0), which ensures integrability of our payoff processes
and finiteness of the subsequent stopping problems.29 The sunk cost of entry is
I > 0.
As X is a geometric Brownian motion, the follower’s payoff at any τ ∈ T
has an explicit representation. Let β1 > 1 be the positive root of the quadratic
equation 12σ2β(β − 1) + µβ − r = 0 and define
xF = β1
β1 − 1(r − µ)I > rI.
Then it is a standard result from the real options and the optimal stopping
literature that the optimal policy for the follower is to invest as soon as the
state process X exceeds the threshold xF , and the associated value is
Fτ := sup
τ ′≥τ
E
[∫ ∞
τ ′
e−rs(Xs − rI) ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ]
=

e−rτ
(
Xτ
xF
)β1 ( xF
r − µ − I
)
if Xτ < xF ,
e−rτ
(
Xτ
r − µ − I
)
else.
If the leader invests at any stopping time τ ∈ T , we denote the optimal
investment time of the follower by
τF (τ) := inf{s ≥ τ |Xs ≥ xF }.
Then the leader’s payoff has a similar explicit representation
Lτ := E
[∫ τF (τ)
τ
e−rs(MXs − rI) ds+
∫ ∞
τF (τ)
e−rs(Xs − rI) ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ]
=

e−rτ
(
MXτ
r − µ − I +
(
Xτ
xF
)β1 (xF (1−M)
r − µ
))
if Xτ < xF ,
Fτ else.
29If r > max(µ, 0), then (e−rtXt) is bounded by an integrable random variable. Indeed,
for σ > 0 we have supt e−rtXt = X0eσZ with Z = suptBt − t(r − µ + σ2/2)/σ, which is
exponentially distributed with rate 2(r − µ)/σ + σ (see, e.g., Revuz and Yor (1999), Exercise
(3.12) 4◦). Thus, E[supt e−rtXt] = X0(1 + σ2/2(r − µ)) ∈ R+, implying that (e−rtXt) is of
class (D); analogously for σ < 0.
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Finally, the payoff from simultaneous investment is simply given by
Mτ := E
[∫ ∞
τ
e−rs(Xs − rI) ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ]
= e−rτ
(
Xτ
r − µ − I
)
,
i.e., Mτ = Fτ = Lτ whenever Xτ ≥ xF . Thanks to the explicit representations,
we see that it suffices to define the processes (Lt), (Ft) and (Mt) for t ∈ R+
(and L∞ = F∞ = M∞ = 0) and to evaluate them at any τ ∈ T for obtaining
the correct payoffs at stopping times, i.e., which mean that the follower invests
at τF (τ). All processes are (right-)continuous like X.
In order to determine when there is a first- or second-mover advantage, we
can rely on the strong Markov property and identify the corresponding regions
of the state space of the process X: there exists a unique xP ∈ (0, xF ) such thatLt < Ft iff Xt ∈ [0, x
P ),
Lt > Ft iff Xt ∈ (xP , xF ).30
Consequently, the interval P = (xP , xF ) is the preemption region for the driv-
ing process X. On {X ∈ P} we have equilibria of immediate stopping, with
coordination by extended mixed strategies following Proposition 3.1 and with
expected payoffs F . Let
τP(ϑ) := inf{s ≥ ϑ |Xs ∈ P}
denote the hitting time of the preemption region after any stopping time ϑ ∈ T .
On {Xϑ < xP } we have Lϑ < Fϑ = E[FτP(ϑ)|Fϑ] = E[LτP(ϑ)|Fϑ], since
F is a martingale in its continuation region up to τF (ϑ) > τP(ϑ). Therefore
the players are indeed willing to wait until τP(ϑ), where the equilibrium payoff
from preemption is FτP(ϑ).
Finally, let M = [xF ,∞), so that Mt = Ft iff Xt ∈ M. On {X ∈ M} we
have equilibria of simultaneous stopping. In fact, given that the preemption
payoffs on {X ∈ P} are F , stopping is even strictly dominant on {X ∈ M},
because then the drift of the supermartingale F is the strictly negative forgone
30Consider time 0, recalling that X0 = x ∈ R+. We express the dependence on the starting
value by writing L0 = L(x) and F0 = F (x). Then L(x)−F (x)→ −I < 0 for x→ 0. Further,
∂(L(x)− F (x))
∂x
= M
r − µ +
β1
xF
(
x
xF
)β1−1 (
I − Mx
F
r − µ
)
.
The term in the last parentheses is strictly negative by M > 1. Thus, the displayed derivative
is strictly decreasing in x, starting at M/(r − µ) > 0 for x = 0 and ending at (1 −M)(β1 −
1)/(r − µ) < 0 for x = xF , where L(xF ) = F (xF ). Hence, there exists a unique xP ∈ (0, xF )
such that L(x)− F (x) < 0 iff x ∈ [0, xP ) and L(x)− F (x) > 0 iff x ∈ (xP , xF ).
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revenue −e−rt(Xt − rI) dt. Thus we obtain the following equilibrium, letting
τM(ϑ) := inf{s ≥ ϑ |Xs ∈M} denote the hitting time ofM. (See the appendix
for details.)
Proposition 4.2. There exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium for the preemptive
market entry game with extended mixed strategies
(
G1, α1
)
and
(
G2, α2
)
given
as follows. For any i = 1, 2 and ϑ ∈ T set
αϑi (t) =

Lt − Ft
Lt −Mt if Lt > Ft ⇔ Xt ∈ P = (x
P , xF ),
1 if Ft = Mt ⇔ Xt ∈M = [xF ,∞),
0 else
and
Gϑi (t) = 1{t≥τP(ϑ)∧τM(ϑ)}
for any t ∈ [ϑ,∞].
The resulting payoffs are V ϑi (Gϑi , αϑi , Gϑj , αϑj ) = E
[
FτP(ϑ)∧τM(ϑ)
∣∣Fϑ].
Fully explicitly, we have
αϑi (t) =
MXt
r − µ − I +
(
Xt
xF
)β1 (
I − Mx
F
r − µ
)
(M − 1)Xt
r − µ +
(
Xt
xF
)β1 ( (1−M)xF
r − µ
) , Xt ∈ P.
The extensions αϑi (·) here inherit continuity from the payoff processes.31 As
remarked more generally in the context of Proposition 3.1, each firm eventually
becomes leader or follower with probability 12 in any subgame that starts with
Xϑ ≤ xP .
4.3. Sensitivity to jumps
The following simple economic example illustrates the sensitivity of the logic
brought forward in Sections 3.1, 3.2 – that stopping is dominated where Li < F i
and Li is (strictly) increasing in expectation – to continuity of the payoff pro-
cesses. We will show that in any equilibrium of the example stopping occurs
31This is clear except for possibly two cases. If Xt = xP , then Lt = Ft and
limu→t 1{Lu>Fu}(Lu − Fu)/(Lu −Mu) = 0 as Lt > Mt for Xt Ó∈ M. If Xt = xF = ∂M,
then
lim
u→t
αϑi (u) = lim
u→t
[
1{Lu>Fu}(Lu − Fu)/(Lu −Mu) + 1{Fu=Mu}
]
= 1 = αϑi (t),
because limx↗xF (L(x)− F (x))/(L(x)−M(x)) = 1 by l’Hôpital (with the notation of fn. 30,
writing also M(x) = M0 for X0 = x).
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strictly before reaching the preemption region (where both players have a first-
mover advantage), although the following regularity properties hold: For each
i = 1, 2 the leader payoff process Li is a strict submartingale that is further
upper-semicontinuous (the usual regularity condition for optimal stopping), and
the follower process F i is continuous; the preemption region is non-empty with
probability 1. We will actually construct subgame-perfect equilibria with im-
mediate stopping at any time.
Consider two rival firms that each can make an investment to diversify to a
new product. If only one firm invests, it will take up the new market, whereas
the other then becomes monopolist for the old product. The latter is worth a
net present value c at the time of investment. Initially only firm 1 has developed
a profitable technology for switching to the new product, such that it can invest
into it at any time. The technology keeps improving, however, so the value
of capturing the new market is increasing in time, even if discounted to time
0. Firm 2 initially has an inferior technology, such that investing into the new
product would only yield it a net present value 1 at the time of investment.
However, firm 2 can catch up to the superior technology at the hazard rate λ > 0,
after which it could realize the same profit as firm 1. As usual, simultaneous
investment is the worst outcome.
We model the payoff processes as follows:
L1 =
(
a− e−rtb)
t∈[0,∞), a = 2 +
r
λ , b =
r
r+λ ,
L2 =
(
e−rt1{t<T} + (a− e−rtb
)
1{t≥T})t∈[0,∞),
F 1 = F 2 =
(
e−rtc
)
t∈[0,∞], c ∈ [1, 1 + b),
≥M1, M2.
The choice of theM i – the payoffs for simultaneous investment – is unimportant
as long as there is a (weak) penalty.32 r > 0 is the fixed discount rate. T is
the random time at which firm 2 catches up, exponentially distributed with
parameter λ, and defined on some stochastic basis (Ω,F , P ). Assume this is
the only uncertainty, i.e., the filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,∞) is generated by the
process (1{t≥T}).
Notice for the sake of the argument that F 2t > L2t on [0, T ) for c > 1.
All processes except for L2 (and M1, M2, if we like) are continuous. L2 is
continuous from the right and upper-semicontinuous from the left, because a >
2 > (1 + b) ≥ e−rt(1 + b). L1 is strictly increasing and also L2 is a strict
submartingale.33 The key property for the intended result is that L2 is strictly
decreasing up to T and exceeds the expected value of becoming follower at T
32Also F 1 can be modified; for the argument we only need F 1 ≤ F 2.
33Fix two times 0 ≤ s < t. On {s ≥ T} we have E[L2t |Fs]− L2s = e−rsb− e−rtb > 0. On
{s < T},
E[L2t |Fs] = e−rtP [T > t |T > s] + (a− e−rtb)P [T ≤ t |T > s]
= e−rte−λ(t−s) + (a− e−rtb)(1− e−λ(t−s))
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as we will show, so firm 2 will stop immediately if there is too little chance to
realize L2 after T .
The preemption region is {(L1 − F 1)∧ (L2 − F 2) > 0} = ⋃ω∈Ω[T (ω),∞) ⊂
Ω × [0,∞] since a > b + c ≥ e−rtb + e−rtc. Its hitting time starting from time
0 is
τP := inf{s ≥ 0 | (L1s − F 1s ) ∧ (L2s − F 2s ) > 0} = T.
Now suppose there is an equilibrium with preemption using extended mixed
strategies inside the preemption region, i.e., with continuation payoff F iϑ for
each firm i = 1, 2 and any stopping time ϑ > τP = T . Assume that at T ,
however, the firms can agree on events A1 and A2 with P [A1 ∩ A2] = 0, such
that firm i even obtains LiT on Ai by playing αi(T ) = 1 and playing αi(T ) = 0
on Aj , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i Ó= j. Let Ai in fact be exactly the event where αi(T ) = 1,
so i’s payoff on Aci is F iT . If there is no stopping on [0, T ), then the expected
payoffs are
E[L1T1{A1} + F 1T1{Ac1}] = E[(a− e−rT b)1{A1} + e−rT c1{Ac1}]
and
E[L2T1{A2} + F 2T1{Ac2}] ≤ E[(a− e−rT b)1{Ac1} + e−rT c1{A1}].
The estimate follows from L2T > F 2T and P [A2 \Ac1] = P [A1 \Ac2] = 0. The sum
of the expected payoffs is not more than a − bE[e−rT ] + cE[e−rT ] = a − (b −
c)λ/(r + λ) < a− b+ 1 = L10 + L20, contradicting the hypothesized equilibrium.
Now suppose there is an equilibrium with mixed strategies GTi in the pre-
emption region. From T onwards, the payoff processes are deterministic and
continuous. Hendricks and Wilson (1992) show that mixed equilibrium strate-
gies must satisfy
dGTi
1−GTi
= dL
j
Lj − F j =
re−rtb dt
a− e−rt(b+ c) , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i Ó= j,
where continuous mixing occurs. We have 0 < (a − e−rt(b + c))−1 ≤ (a − b −
c)−1 < λ(r + λ)/(r2 + λ2) <∞ and thus ∫∞
T
(1−GTi )−1 dGTi <∞, i = 1, 2, so
there would remain some mass for stopping at t =∞ for both firms. However,
M i∞ ≤ F i∞ = 0 < limt↗∞ Lit = a for both i = 1, 2, so there cannot be joint
stopping at t =∞.
It follows from Theorems 2 and 3 in Hendricks and Wilson (1992) that at
T there only exist equilibria with at least one firm i stopping immediately, i.e.,
and thus
∂E[L2t |Fs]/∂t = −(r + λ)e−rte−λ(t−s)(1 + b) + aλe−λ(t−s) + re−rtb > 0 ∀t > s ≥ 0
⇔ aλert + reλ(t−s)b > (r + λ)(1 + b) ∀t > s ≥ 0
⇔ aλ+ rb ≥ (r + λ)(1 + b)
⇔ a ≥ (1 + b) + r
λ
.
Hence, E[L2t |Fs] > limu↘s E[L2u |Fs] = e−rs = L2s.
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max
{
GT1 (T ), GT2 (T )
}
= 1. A firm that stops receives not more than LiT and the
respective other receives F jT (possibly from simultaneous stopping if F iT = M iT ,
i = 1, 2). Now the previous argument based on the sets Ai = {GTi (T ) = 1}
applies again, so stopping must occur strictly before T in equilibrium.
The estimate above extends to any time t ∈ [0, T ), taking conditional expec-
tations. In fact, there exist the following subgame-perfect equilibria with either
firm stopping immediately on [0, T ). Set
αϑ1 (t) = 1{t≥T}
L2t − F 2t
L2t −M2t
and αϑ2 (t) = 1{t≥T}
L1t − F 1t
L1t −M1t
for all stopping times ϑ and t ∈ [0,∞). Now pick i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i Ó= j and
set Gϑi = 1{t≥ϑ} (stop immediately) and Gϑj = 1{t≥ϑ∨T} (stop at preemption
region) for all ϑ. On {ϑ ≥ T} there is preemption with payoffs F 1ϑ , F 2ϑ . On {ϑ <
T}, j cannot deviate profitably because M j ≤ F j . Firm i could wait until any
τ ≥ ϑ to obtain Liτ1{τ<T}+F iT1{τ≥T}. The process (Lit1{t<T}+F iT1{t≥T})t≥0
is however a strict supermartingale for both i = 1, 2 with our parametrization.34
Thus, stopping immediately is indeed optimal.
5. Outlook
Having illustrated in Section 4 how our framework can be used for a rigorous
analysis of typical preemption models, we now point out how new results can
be obtained that extend the existing literature on timing games. This will also
concern games with more than two players.
The examples considered here have involved stopping only due to preemp-
tion (except for the last model with Poisson-type uncertainty), and whenever
stopping has occurred with some probability, it has with probability one. This
is a typical observation for many applications, but of course a very special case.
In general, if Proposition 3.1 is applied to model preemption where both
players have a first-mover advantage, one has to determine if any player wants to
stop before such a point is reached, which amounts to solving contrained optimal
stopping problems. Different approaches are available. If the timing game is
symmetric, the characterization of solutions from the general theory of optimal
stopping (in terms of the Snell envelope as in El Karoui (1981), e.g.) can be used
to establish the existence and even a meaningful characterization of subgame-
perfect equilibria under extremely general assumptions on the payoff processes,
see Steg (2015b). Previously, there have not been any general existence results
34Fix two times 0 ≤ s < t. On {s < T} we have E[L1t1{t<T} + F 1T 1{t≥T} |Fs] = (a −
e−rtb)e−λ(t−s) (for F 1 ≡ 0) and
E[L2t1{t<T} + F 2T 1{t≥T} |Fs] = e−rte−λ(t−s) + e−rsc λr+λ (1− e−(r+λ)(t−s))
(resp. E[L1t1{t<T} + F 1T 1{t≥T} |Fs] ≤ (a − e−rtb)e−λ(t−s) + e−rsc λr+λ (1 − e−(r+λ)(t−s))
for any other choice of F 1 ≤ F 2). Now one can continue as in fn. 33.
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for subgame-perfect equilibria of stochastic timing games. The Gϑi play a crucial
role for symmetric equilibria and will be nondegenerate in many cases.
If the uncertainty results from a Markov process, one can use PDE meth-
ods to analyze the stopping problems and, thus, equilibria. Steg and Thijssen
(2015) propose a real option model with a two-dimensional state process which
randomly generates first- and second-mover advantages. Their equilibrium char-
acterization involves the solution of a free boundary problem, and the players
stop with a Markovian hazard rate in a certain region of the state space.
Finally, we now demonstrate that the concept of strategies and equilibrium
we have chosen can produce results where other generalizations of Nash equilib-
rium are known to fail. Specifically, we construct a subgame-perfect equilibrium
for a three-player timing game from Laraki et al. (2005), who show that this
game has no ε-equilibrium for ε > 0 small enough (whereas any deterministic
two-player timing game has a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium).
The payoffs do not depend on when the first player stops, but only on who
stops first, possibly simultaneously. To describe the coordination conflict, imag-
ine the players sitting on a circle, player 3 to the right of player 2 to the right
of player 1. Now player i + 1 or i + 2 is going to mean the player one or two
positions to the right of player i. If one player i stops before i + 1 and i + 2,
the respective payoffs are ui{i} = 1, u
i+1
{i} = 0 and u
i+2
{i} = −1. If two players
i and i + 1 stop simultaneously before player i + 2, the respective payoffs are
ui{i,i+1} = 0, u
i+1
{i,i+1} = −1 and ui+2{i,i+1} = 1. If all players stop simultaneously,
each receives 0. These payoffs are zero-sum and imply that whatever group
happens to stop first, some player will want to deviate by quitting or joining.
Laraki et al. (2005) argue that even ε-equilibria in mixed strategies fail to
exist. We now apply extended mixed strategies and argue that a subgame-
perfect equilibrium exists with each player i using αϑi (t) = 12 > 0 for all t ≥ ϑ.
To do so we refrain from extending Definition 2.9 to more than two players for
all eventualities under our weak regularity conditions. The reason is that given
the strictly positive extensions and that only unilateral deviations need to be
considered, we can rely on the definitions for two players and Proposition 3.1.35
Specifically, we focus on whether player i, when deviating, becomes single
35It is straightforward to extend Definition 2.9 if, as in the current case, some player’s
extension starts with a strictly positive value, and if one demands the extensions to have
right-hand limits. Then the present equilibrium can be easily verified directly. For instance,
the outcome probability that the group of players who become (joint) leaders is a given set
I ⊆ {1, 2, 3} is again that from an infinitely repeated game with constant stage stopping
probabilities αϑi (ϑ). Writing αϑi (ϑ) = si for brevity, the probability is given by∏
i∈I
si
∏
j∈{1,2,3}\I
(1−sj)·
( ∞∑
n=0
3∏
j=1
(1− sj)n
)
=
∏
i∈I
si
∏
j∈{1,2,3}\I
(1−sj)·
(
1−
3∏
j=1
(1− sj)
)−1
.
This formula also has to be amended by a “first round” if some player uses either an isolated
mass point ∆Gϑi (ϑ) ∈ (0, 1) or αϑi (ϑ) = 0 < αϑi (ϑ+), in which case one sets si = αϑi (ϑ+) in
the formula.
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leader, joint leader or follower, because given our (limit) interpretation of the
extensions, the probabilities for whom of players i + 1 and i + 2 belongs to
the leaders conditional on at least one of them doing so are given by (abusing
notation for brevity)[
1− (1− αϑi+1)(1− αϑi+2)]−1 · (αϑi+1(1− αϑi+2), (1− αϑi+1)αϑi+2, αϑi+1αϑi+2),
i.e., presently 13 for each scenario. Thus, player i’s expected payoffs conditional
on becoming single leader, joint leader, or follower are 1, 13 (0 − 1 + 0) = − 13
and 13 (0 − 1 + 1) = 0, respectively, and facing two opponents with strictly
positive extensions is the same as facing one opponent with extension values
1 − (1 − αϑi+1)(1 − αϑi+2) = αϑi+1 + αϑi+2 − αϑi+1αϑi+2 = 34 and payoffs Liϑ = 1,
M iϑ = − 13 , and F iϑ = 0. As 34 = 1−01−(−1/3) , Proposition 3.1 implies that αϑi (t) =
1
21{t≥ϑ} (and hence Gϑi (t) = 1{t≥ϑ}) is optimal for player i. The resulting
expected payoff is zero. Time consistency holds trivially with constant positive
extension, so we obtain a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. By construction, Gϑi and αϑi are a.s. [0, 1]-valued.
Gϑi is right-continuous, non-decreasing, attaining 1 where αϑi (t) > 0, t ≥ ϑ. αϑi
takes values in (0, 1) only where (L1t − F 1t ) ∧ (L2t − F 2t ) > 0, where it is indeed
right-continuous.
Gϑi is adapted. αϑi is progressively measurable because we can represent
it using the process (1{t=inf{u≥t | (L1u−F 1u)∧(L2u−F 2u)>0}})t≥0, which is the upper-
right-continuous modification of the optional process (1{(L1t−F 1t )∧(L2t−F 2t )>0})t≥0
and therefore progressively measurable by Theorem IV.33 (c) in Dellacherie and
Meyer (1978) as our filtration F satisfies the usual conditions.
By ϑ = τP(ϑ) we also have ϑ = τˆϑi = inf{u ≥ ϑ |αϑi (u) > 0} and Liϑ ≥ F iϑ
a.s., i = 1, 2. By our observations about (3.2) we have indifference if (L1ϑ −
F 1ϑ) ∧ (L2ϑ − F 2ϑ) > 0, implying payoff F 1ϑ , resp. F 2ϑ , and it only remains to
verify that each player i obtains max{F iϑ, αϑj (ϑ)M iϑ + (1 − αϑj (ϑ))Liϑ} in the
cases L1ϑ = F 1ϑ or L2ϑ = F 2ϑ . Now fix i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i Ó= j. Consider first Liϑ = F iϑ.
If Ljϑ > F
j
ϑ, then αϑj (ϑ) = 1, so αϑi (ϑ) = 0 is optimal. If also L
j
ϑ = F
j
ϑ,
then still αϑj (ϑ) = 1 if F iϑ = M iϑ and player i is indifferent. If L
j
ϑ = F
j
ϑ and
F iϑ > M
i
ϑ, then αϑj (ϑ) = αϑj (ϑ+) = 0. Now αϑi (ϑ) = 1 is optimal if F
j
ϑ = M
j
ϑ,
and αϑi (ϑ) = αϑi (ϑ+) = 0 is optimal if F
j
ϑ > M
j
ϑ as then λϑM = 0. In all these
cases the payoff is F iϑ = Liϑ.
Finally consider Liϑ > F iϑ and L
j
ϑ = F
j
ϑ. Then αϑj (ϑ) = 0 and thus αϑi (ϑ) = 1
is optimal. In this case the payoff is Liϑ.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Admissibility of the strategies for any ϑ ∈ T is ob-
tained as in the proof of Proposition 3.1 and time-consistency is obvious. For
any ϑ ∈ T and i = 1, 2, (Gϑi , αϑi ) is also admissible for the subgame starting
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at τP(ϑ) and Proposition 3.1 shows that
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
and
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
are mutual
best replies at τP(ϑ). For {ϑ = τP(ϑ)} this directly implies optimality. For
{ϑ < τP(ϑ)} and any admissible (Gϑa , αϑa), time consistency and iterated ex-
pectations yield the estimate
V ϑi
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
≤ V ϑi
(
Gϑa1{t<τP(ϑ)} + 1{t≥τP(ϑ)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1{t≥τP(ϑ)}
[
Gϑa(τP(ϑ)−) + (1−Gϑa(τP(ϑ)−))Gϑi
], αϑa1{t<τP(ϑ)} + αϑi 1{t≥τP(ϑ)}, Gϑj , αϑj
)
,
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i Ó= j. Furthermore, since 1{t<τP(ϑ)}∆Gϑj (t) ≡ 0,
V ϑi
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= V ϑi
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a1{t≥τP(ϑ)}, Gϑj , αϑj
)
.
These two facts, together with Gϑj (τP(ϑ)−) = 0 and a change of variable as in
Lemma B.2, yield the estimate
V ϑi
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
≤ V ϑi
(
Gϑa1{t<τP(ϑ)} + 1{t≥τP(ϑ)}, αϑi , Gϑj , αϑj
)
= E
[∫
[0,τP(ϑ))
Lis dG
ϑ
a(s) + (1−Gϑa(τP(ϑ)−))V τ
P(ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)∣∣∣∣Fϑ]
=
∫ 1
0
E
[
LiτGa (x)1{τGa (x)∈[0,τP(ϑ))}
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] dx
+
∫ 1
0
E
[
V
τP(ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
1{τGa (x)∈[τP(ϑ),∞]}
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] dx
≤ ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[
Liτ1{τ<τP(ϑ)} + V
τP(ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
1{τ≥τP(ϑ)}
∣∣∣Fϑ].
Fubini’s Theorem is applied in the second to last step. At τP(ϑ), the optimal
payoff is
V
τP(ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= F iτP(ϑ)1{Lj
τP (ϑ)>F
j
τP (ϑ)}
+ LiτP(ϑ)1{Lj
τP (ϑ)=F
j
τP (ϑ)}
.
If Li and F i are continuous, i = 1, 2, then (L1τP(ϑ)−F 1τP(ϑ))∧(L2τP(ϑ)−F 2τP(ϑ)) =
0 on {ϑ < τP(ϑ)}, a.s. Hence, for the given strategies,
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= E
[
V
τP(ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)∣∣∣Fϑ]
= E
[
LiτP(ϑ)1{Lj
τP (ϑ)>F
j
τP (ϑ)}
+ LiτP(ϑ)1{Lj
τP (ϑ)=F
j
τP (ϑ)}
∣∣∣Fϑ]
= E
[
LiτP(ϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ] = ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[
Liτ∧τP(ϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
= ess sup
τ≥ϑ
E
[
Liτ1{τ<τP(ϑ)} + V
τP(ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
1{τ≥τP(ϑ)}
∣∣∣Fϑ].
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Therefore, player i has no incentive to change the strategy
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
by placing
any mass on [ϑ, τP(ϑ)).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 3.3,
except that we use the martingale property of F in its continuation region {X ∈
[0, xF )} instead of a submartingale property of L.36 Concerning the payoffs, fix
ϑ ∈ T . If Xϑ ≥ xP , then the payoffs to both players are V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
=
Fϑ and optimality follows again from Proposition 3.1. If Xϑ < xP , i.e., ϑ <
τP(ϑ), then we replace the estimate in the proof of Theorem 3.3 by
V ϑi
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
≤ V ϑi
(
Gϑa1{t<τP(ϑ)} + 1{t≥τP(ϑ)}, αϑi , Gϑj , αϑj
)
= E
[∫
[0,τP(ϑ))
Ls dG
ϑ
i (s) + (1−Gϑa(τP(ϑ)−))V τ
P(ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)∣∣∣∣Fϑ]
=
∫ 1
0
E
[
LτGa (x)1{τGa (x)∈[0,τP(ϑ))}
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] dx
+
∫ 1
0
E
[
V
τP(ϑ)
i
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
1{τGa (x)∈[τP(ϑ),∞]}
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] dx
≤
∫ 1
0
E
[
FτGa (x)1{τGa (x)∈[0,τP(ϑ))}
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] dx
+
∫ 1
0
E
[
FτP(ϑ)
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
1{τGa (x)∈[τP(ϑ),∞]}
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] dx
= E
[
FτP(ϑ)
∣∣Fϑ] = V ϑi (Gϑi , αϑi , Gϑj , αϑj ).
Appendix B. Technical results
Lemma B.1. A measurable process X = (Xt)t∈R+ is of class (D) iff the set
{Xτ | τ a stopping time} is uniformly integrable for any given X∞ ∈ L1(P ).
Proof. We only need to show necessity. Let X be of class (D), fix arbitrary
X∞ ∈ L1(P ), and let T denote the set of all stopping times. Then, for any
τ ∈ T and n ∈ N, |Xτ∧n|1{τ<∞} ≤ |Xτ∧n|. The set {|Xτ∧n|1{τ<∞} | τ ∈
T , n ∈ N} ∪ {|Xτ | | τ ∈ T , τ < ∞} is thus uniformly integrable, too. As
we may also include limits in probability of its elements, and |Xτ |1{τ<∞} =
limn→∞ |Xτ∧n|1{τ<∞} a.s. for any τ ∈ T , we observe that {|Xτ |1{τ<∞} | τ ∈
T } is uniformly integrable.
For X∞ ∈ L1(P ), also {|X∞|1{τ=∞} | τ ∈ T } is uniformly integrable. Now
let ε > 0. By uniform integrability there exists δ > 0 such that for any measur-
ableA with P (A) < δ and any τ ∈ T it holds that max{E[|Xτ |1{τ<∞}1{A}], E[|X∞|1{τ=∞}1{A}]} ≤
36L need not be a submartingale outside the preemption region, depending on the parameter
values. In particular one can show that if µ ≤ 0, the drift of L is strictly negative for all M
sufficiently close to 1 and Xt sufficiently close to xP .
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ε
2 . Therefore E[(|Xτ |1{τ<∞}+|X∞|1{τ=∞})1{A}] ≤ ε, showing that {|Xτ |1{τ<∞}+|X∞|1{τ=∞} | τ ∈ T } is uniformly integrable as claimed.
Lemma B.2. If L is a (measurable) process of class (D) then there exists a
constant K ∈ R+ such that for any process G that is a.s. right-continuous, non-
decreasing, non-negative and bounded by some G∞ ∈ L∞(P ) and all random
variables 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ ∞ a.s. it holds that
(1)
E
[∫
[a,b)
|Lt| dGt
]
≤ K‖G∞‖∞ <∞
and
(2) ∫
[a,b)
|Lt| dGt =
∫ ∞
0
∣∣LτG(x)∣∣1{τG(x)∈[a,b)} dx <∞ a.s.,
where τG(x) := inf{t ≥ 0 |Gt ≥ x}, x ∈ R+, and ∆G0 ≡ G0; equivalently,
“Gt > x” in τG(x).
If {|Lτ |1{τ<∞} | τ ∈ T } is bounded in L∞(P ) by K ∈ R+ and G bounded
by some G∞ ∈ L1(P ), then (1) holds with KE[G∞] instead and (2) as stated.
Proof. The (a.s.) non-decreasing family of stopping times
(
τG(x)
)
x∈R+ is the
left-continuous inverse of G, which satisfies
τG(x) ≤ t ⇔ Gt ≥ x.
Thus, with the convention
∫
[0,c] dG = Gc,
∫
[0,∞) 1{A} dG =
∫∞
0 1{τG(x)∈A} dx
for all A ∈ {[0, c] | c ∈ R+} and also for A = R+ (by monotone convergence) a.s.
By a monotone class argument37 the relation holds for all Borel sets from R+
a.s.
Since L·(ω) : R+ → R, t Ô→ Lt(ω), is Borel measurable38 like the function
1{t∈[a(ω),b(ω))}, we now obtain the following change-of-variable formula39:∫
[a,b)
|Lt| dGt =
∫
{τG(x)<∞}
∣∣LτG(x)∣∣1{τG(x)∈[a,b)} dx a.s.
As inf{t ≥ 0 |Gt > x} = τG(x+), which differs from τG(x) only on a set
of Lebesgue measure zero, we can equivalently use the former. By Fubini’s
Theorem
E
[∫ ∞
0
∣∣LτG(x)∣∣1{τG(x)∈[a,b)} dx] ≤ ∫ ‖G∞‖∞
0
E
[∣∣LτG(x)∣∣1{τG(x)<∞}] dx.
(B.1)
37See, e.g., Kallenberg (2002), Theorem 1.1.
38See, e.g., Kallenberg (2002), Lemma 1.26 (i).
39See, e.g., Kallenberg (2002), Lemma 1.22. One needs to restrict dx to {τG(x) < ∞},
which is redundant when integrating over [a, b).
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As L is of class (D), {|Lτ |1{τ<∞} | τ ∈ T } is bounded in L1(P ) by some
K < ∞, whence the RHS of (B.1) is bounded by K‖G∞‖∞ if the latter is
finite. If supτ∈T ‖Lτ1{τ<∞}‖∞ ≤ K and G bounded by G∞ ∈ L1(P ), then the
RHS of (B.1) is bounded by∫ ∞
0
E
[
K1{τG(x)<∞}
]
dx = E
[∫ ∞
0
K1{τG(x)<∞} dx
]
≤ KE[G∞] <∞.
In either case it follows that
∫
[a,b) |Lt| dGt <∞ a.s.
Lemma B.3. Suppose α is a progressively measurable process and oα its op-
tional projection.40 Let τ ∈ T be given. Then oα is a.s. right-continuous at
τ <∞ where α is so.
Proof. For any ε > 0 define τε := inf{t ≥ τ | |αt − ατ | > ε} ∈ T as α is
progressive. Then the set Bε := {(ω, t) | τ ≤ t < ∞, oαt − oατ > ε} ∩ [τ, τε) is
optional and P [σ ∈ Bε] = 0 for any σ ∈ T because ασ = oασ on {σ <∞} a.s.
Hence, if we denote by Aε the canonical projection of Bε onto Ω, P [Aε] = 0 by
the optional section theorem (Dellacherie and Meyer (1978), Theorem IV.84),
and therefore Ac :=
⋂
n∈NA
c
1/n is an a.s. event with (Ac × R+) ∩ B1/n = ∅,
n ∈ N. By switching signs we obtain the same result for |oαt − oατ | > 1/n in
B1/n (we do not rename any sets).
Now, given any ω ∈ Ac for which α is right-continuous at τ , we must
have τ1/çε−1è(ω) > τ for any ε > 0, such that |oαt − oατ | ≤ 1/
⌈
ε−1
⌉ ≤ ε
on [τ(ω), τ1/çε−1è(ω)) Ó= ∅.
Appendix C. Supplementary results
Lemma C.1. Suppose ϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆϑ2 and 0 = αϑi (ϑ) < αϑj (ϑ) < 1. Then
λϑM
λϑ
L,i
= α
ϑ
j (ϑ)
1−αϑ
j
(ϑ) .
Proof. We introduce the function µF (x, y) := µL(y, x) = 1−µL(x, y)−µM (x, y)
and use the short-hand notation
µ· = lim inf
t↘ϑ
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)>0
µ·(αϑi (t), αϑj (t)), µ· = lim sup
t↘ϑ
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)>0
µ·(αϑi (t), αϑj (t)),
αi = lim inf
t↘ϑ
αϑi (t), αi = lim sup
t↘ϑ
αϑi (t) and αj = αϑj (ϑ).
40oα is the unique optional process such that E[oατ1{τ<∞} |Fτ ] = ατ1{τ<∞} a.s. for
every τ ∈ T (cf., e.g., Revuz and Yor, 1999, Theorem 5.6).
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In our current case ϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆϑ2 and 0 = αϑi (ϑ) < αϑj (ϑ) < 1 we have
λϑL,i = (1− αj)
1
2(µL + µL),
λϑL,j = αj + (1− αj)
1
2(µF + µF )
and thus
λϑM = 1− λϑL,i − λϑL,j
= (1− αj)12(2− µL − µL − µF − µF ).
Using αj = limt↘ϑ αϑj (t) and the continuity and monotonicity of µL and µF we
obtain
λϑM
λϑL,i
=
2− µL − µL − µF − µF
µL + µL
=
2− µL(αi, αj)− µL(αi, αj)− µF (αi, αj)− µF (αi, αj)
µL(αi, αj) + µL(αi, αj)
=
µM (αi, αj) + µM (αi, αj)
µL(αi, αj) + µL(αi, αj)
= αj1− αj .
Lemma C.2. Fix σ ∈ T and suppose (G1, α1) and (G2, α2) are time-consistent
extended mixed strategies which induce an equilibrium in all subgames Γϑ begin-
ning at some ϑ ∈ T taking values in (σ,∞] a.s.
If σ = τˆσ1 = τˆσ2 and limt↘σ ασ1 (t) = limt↘σ ασ2 (t) = 0, then
L1σ − F 1σ = L2σ − F 2σ = 0 a.s.
Note that we do not impose right-continuity of any ασi at σ in the lemma.
Proof. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i Ó= j. Suppose first Liσ > F iσ. By hypothesis there exist
arbitrarily small right (random) neighbourhoods of σ in which ασi is bounded
away from 1, in which ασj takes some strictly positive values, and in which
Li > F i (≥ M i). In any such neighbourhood we must have by condition (3.1)
that
ασj > 0⇒ ασj ≥
Li − F i
Li −M i ,
implying lim supt↘σ L
i−F i
Li−Mi = 0 and therefore Liσ = F iσ.
Now suppose Liσ < F iσ. Then in any right (random) neighbourhood of σ
in which Li < F i and ασj is bounded away from 1, ασi can only be strictly
positive where ασj = 0, i.e., the supports of ασi and ασj in these neighbourhoods
must be disjoint. Hence, whenever ασi > 0, player i becomes leader and must
prefer so over becoming follower at the next time when ασj > 0. Now consider
neighbourhoods between σ and
σ′ := inf
{
t ≥ σ ∣∣Lit − Liσ ≥ (F iσ − Liσ)/3 or F it − F iσ ≤ −(F iσ − Liσ)/3} > σ.
35
At any stopping time ϑ ∈ [σ, σ′], i can only prefer to stop if ασj = 0 on [σ, σ′],
which contradicts the hypothesis.
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